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MATHEMATICS AND 
THE PHYSICAL WORLD: 
A RECONSIDERATION 
Nc)rm311 DE SILVA 
T HE PRINCIPAL purpose of this article is to suggest two things: first, tint 
a widely held interpretation of the fathers of the scientifîc revolutîon is dubious: 
and second, that this same interpretation can best be replaced by another whieh 
harmonizes more wîth what these and other physieists do in faet say. 
The interpretation in question arises when asking why a mathematical ap-
proach to nature is not only successful, but even possible, and it consists in main-
taining that according to the majority opinion of the physicists themselves, nature 
is "essentially" or "fundamentally" mathematical. Thus E.A. Burtt, in his now 
classic Metaphysicaf Foundations of Modern Science, summarizes what he believes to 
be the position of post-Renaissance scientists with these words: 
Wc have observed that the heart of the new scientific metaphysics is to be 
found in the aseription of ultimatc rcality and causal efficacy to the world of 
mathematics, which world is identified with the realm of material bodies mo-
ving in space and time. Expressed somewhat more fully ... the real world in 
which man lives is no longer regarded as a world of substances possessed of as 
many ultimate qualities as can be experienced in them, but has become a world 
of atoms (now electrons), equipped with none but mathematical characteris-
tics, and moving according to laws fully statable in mathematical form. l 
Alexander Koyré follows suit when he writes, "Elle (modern science at its in-
ception) choisit la précision comme principe; elle affirme que \e réel est géomé-
trique par essence et soumis, par conséquent, à la détermination ct à la mesure 
rigoureuses ... "2 And A.C. Crombie maintains, "The momentous change that Gali-
\eo, along with other platonizing mathematicians like Kepler, introduced into scien-
tific ontology was to identify the substance of the real world with the mathematieal 
entities contained in the theories used to describe the 'appearances' ".3 
l. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1964: p. 300. 
2. "Une Expérience de mesure", in ÉTudes d'hisToire de la pensù scientifique, Paris. Presses Univer~i" 
taires de France. 1966, p. 259: cf. also pp. 69, 150-151 fI. 
3. Robert Gro5sercste and the Origins ol' Expenmemal SCience. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1953. p. J 10 
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Now if this position supposedly propounded by the physicists is true, then the 
successes of a purely mathematical physics are easily explicable; yet certain further 
consequences accrue that are quite disconcerting. For one, any investigation of 
nature employing non-mathematical tools or concepts is sim ply barking up a wrong 
tree. The biological sciences, psychology, etc., are all superfluous entcrprises lO the 
degree that they eschew considerations of the mathematical aspects of their sub-
jects; and the little they can contribute to lcarning is restricted to discoveries 
concerning certain épiphenomena, the knowledge of whieh is hardly worth the 
effort. Secondly, and allied to the first, the natural thing that is man becomcs 
largely inexplicable. The thoughts and aspirations that characterize him are see-
mingly barred from mathematical analysis, and hence ipso facto subjective, or 
unreal. Ironically enough, the scope of mathematical physics would preclude consi-
deration of the very being responsible for that science to begin with. 
These consequences, being grave, force us to re-examine the conclusions of the 
aforementioned historians. Do ail of the renowned physicists, or even a majority, 
maintain that nature is in essence mathematical? Is this the most faithful manner of 
understanding the "heart of the new scientific metaphysics" ') The central thesis of 
what follows is that it is not. The statements of Kepler, Galileo and others need not 
be read as Burtt has insisted, for there exists another interpretation far more in 
keeping with what they actually do say. This second interpretation, we hope to 
show, is more characteristic of scientists than the first, as witness a close exami-
nation of the key passages of their works. Moreover, certain modifications of what 
we consider to be the actual position of these seminal thinkers will be presented, as 
made by several physicists of this century. These modifications, we suggest, render 
the position very much akin to an outlook proposed by a number of physicists as 
far back as Aristotle, which outlook indeed provides a basis for a mathematical 
approach to nature, yet without the adverse consequences above enumerated. 
These being our c1aims, four things are required to substantiate them. First, a 
brief criticism of Burtt's interpretation must be adduced! followed by a summary 
of our own; thirdly, representative texts from 20lh century scientists will be taken 
in relation to the views of their predecessors, manifesting to what extent they agree 
and disagree with what we consider Newton, Galileo, Kepler, etc., to be actually 
saying; lastly, we will attempt to link the position of the current scientists to a 
tradition beginning with Aristotle - a tie that would emphasize ail the more 
strongly that we need not adhere to any mathematization of nature to explain the 
possibility and successes of a mathcmatical physics. 
* 
* * 
To begin with, it is not Burtt's allegation that al] physicists considered nature 
to be in essence mathematical. He is careful to expose the "non-mathematical 
4. According 10 Koyré himself. Burt! besl exposed the mctaphysical pre-suppositions of modern 
science (cf. op. cit .. p. 172, n. 2), and for this reason, in addition to Burt!'s analysis being more 
exhaustive than any of Koyré's or Crombie's, we will rcstrict ourselvc, to a critique of the former's 
Metaphysical Foundations. etc. 
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current", represented by thinkers such as Gilbert and, to a certain extent, such men 
as Boyle and Harvey,' These, though, were not responsible for the "scientific 
revolution", nor for the supposed world view consequent upon that upheaval. 
Others are held accountable for this, most notably Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, 
Descartes, Hobbes and Newton. According to Burlt, the mathematical or quan-
tified view of nature was clearly affirmed by these thinkers, hence to his treatment 
of them wc must now turn. 
ln the case of Copernicus, our author would draw this conclusion: "He had 
become convinced that the whole uni verse was made of numbers, hence whatevcr 
was mathematically truc, was really or astronomically truc. "6 1 t is to be noted that 
no citations from Copernicus' writings are offered in support of this; instead, two 
arguments are advanced that in Burtt's mind necessarily lead one to identifying 
Copernicus' thought with that of Pythagoras'. The first stems from Copernicus' 
reason for professing his revolutionary heliocentric hypothesis, viz., that su ch a 
conception "threw the facts of astronomy into a simpler and more harmonious 
mathematical order."7 Now for Burtt, the only possible justification for this pre-
mise is the statement "the universc as a whole, including our earth," is "fundamen-
tally mathematical in its structure". 8 What we have then, is a conditional argument 
constructed by Burtt, in which Copernicus affirms the consequence, while he 
(Burtt) goes on to affirm the antecedent, to thereby conclude that this very ante-
cede nt must be Copernicus' position. Yet to so reason is to fall into the fallacy of 
the consequent. Our author has not shown that if, and on/!' if nature is essentially 
mathematical, th en one must al ways strive for the more simple mathematical hypo-
thesis. In fact, there definitely exists an alternative antecedent premise to this 
argument, one to which Ptolemy ascribed, as did Aristotle before him. This arose 
from the ancients' conception of the middle science of astronomy, wherein the aim 
was "to save the appearances" in terms of the simplest, mathematical hypothesis. 9 
In justifying such a science, it was not necessary to equate nature and mathematics, 
but merely assume - or better yet recognize - the close proximity between the 
trajectories of the heavenly bodies and certain geometrical configurations. This 
assumption was Aristotle 's, JO Ptolemy's, Il and more likely than not, Copernicus', 12 
for in ma king it, one is at perfect liberty to heliocentrize the universe if this 
5, Metaphysical Foundations, see especially pp. 156-160. 
6, Ibid., p. 44. 
7. BURTT, ibid., p. 26. 
8. Ibid., p. 40. 
9. èr. r: DIJlïFM, Ta Save the Phenomenon, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1969. 
10. Cf. De Cae/o, 1, ch. 2 and 3, as found in The Basic Wur"s olAristot!c, cd. R. McKeon, New York, 
Random House, 1941, pp. 399-403: cf. also De Cae!o IL ch. 4 & ff. : Physics II, ch. 2: Metaphy.ücs 
XII, ch. 8. 
II. Cf. "The Almagest", Bk l, Preface, in The GreaI Books of the WesEeYn World, ed. R.M. Hutchins: 
Chicago, Encyclopaedla Britannica, Ine., 1952: Vol. 16, pp. 5-6. 
12. "Revolution of the Heavenly Spheres", Preface and Dedication to Popc Paul III, ln ibid., pp.50h-7: 
Bk l, Introductory Paragraphs, pp. 510-11 : Kuhn 's opinion of Copernicus in this respect would 
scem to coneur with our own - Sec his C"opernican Revolurion (N.Y .. Vlntage Books. 1959) pp. 136, 
144. 14X, IX2-X4. See al", DRII IXS A HilTOn of Al"lronolnllro//1 Tha!c.I 10 Kepler. :\.Y., Dover 
Publications [ne .. 195), pp. 312-13, 319-321. 
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accounts for the phenomena in a simpler, more efficient manner. And although the 
theory of Copernicus runs counter to the teachings of the aforementioncd ancients 
on points of astronomy, it is not thereby necessarily opposed to their position on 
the relation of mathematics to nature. 
The second argument is even weaker. Apparently Copernicus spent several 
years studying with the Pythagorean Dominicus Maria de Novara, whose influence 
was a determining factor in the former's world vicw. U lJndoubtcdly it was, but is 
that sufficient to make the point'l Novara may very weil have bolstered Copernicus' 
aspirations to discover the simplest mathematical hypothesis, but there is no tcxtual 
cvidence in Copernicus indicating a wholesale adoption of Novara's Pythago-
reanism. 
The next thinker to have supposedly accepted the mathematical vicw of nature 
was Kepler. ln his case, several texts are cited which ostensibly indicate this. Thus, 
to support his claim that for Kepler, "The real world is a world of quantitative 
characteristics only: its differences are differences of number alone," Burtt cites the 
passage: "Wherever there are qualities, there are Iikewise quantities, but not vice 
versa". To justify his having Kepler say, "quantity is the fundamental feature of 
things", Burt! quotes his assertion that quantity is "primarium accidens substan-
tiae".14 But neither of these statements arc equivalent to Burtt's interpretation of 
them; on the contrary, both are mere repetitions of wellknown Aristotelian doc-
trines - something of which assuredly Kepler was aware. Thus we have every 
reasoll to think that he conceded their literaI import : to wit, quantity is an accident 
of physical things. as distinguished from their substance, yet the first and most 
important accident, being the subject of other accidents su ch as figure, color, etc. 
Quantity, then, is not the substance or essence of things and, if anything, Burtt's 
alluding to these passages discloses a fundamental concord between Kepler and 
Aristotle on this issue, rather than any disagreement. I ., 
Nor do other doctrines of Kepler - referred to in Burtt's analysis - attesting 
1hat "God was a mathematician", or "perfect knowledge is always mathematical" 
necessarily suggest an identity between quantity and physical essences. We will 
have occasion bclow to exhibit the possibility of upholding these, yet ail the while 
denying the nature-mathematics equivalence. 
The third physicist of outstanding repute cited by Burlt as a proponent of the 
"new metaphysical outlook" is Galileo. Herc potent textual evidencc exists see-
mingly supporting an identification of mathematics and the nature of the physical 
world. The famous passages from the" Assayer" are quoted in full, inciuding the 
"Language of Nature" excerpt, in addition to the one wherein the reality of the 
proper sensibles, or "secondary qualities", are denied. 16 Moreover, there is refe-
13. HunT, 01'. cil., pp. 42-44. 
14. Ibid. pp. 56-57. 
l='. Fven Koyré acknowledges Kepler's '"failure"' to have mathematized the universe as his successor 
Galile" evidently succccded in doing. See Ko\R(, al'. cil .. p. 46. 
16. BIIRII, 01'. cil., pp. 6X, 74-76, 78-80; the same passages in Galilen can he f(lund in Discoverics 
and Opinions ol Galileo. Stillman Drake. cd .. NY .. Double Day Anchor Books. 1957, pp. 237-8. 
274-7. 
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rence to the Florentine's atomism - i.e., the existence of infinitely smalt, indivisible 
particles, which in Burtt's view, "possess none but mathematical qualities".17 Let us 
examine each of these doctrines, to sec if our author's rcading of them is the correct 
one. 
"The Book of nature is written in the Mathematical language, and the symbols 
are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, without whose help it is impos-
sible to comprehend a single word of it."I' [t should be notecl at the outset that 
Galileo's assertion is not an outright equating of the mathematical and the substan-
ce of the natural; it is rather a figurative manner of emphasizing the rolc which 
mathematical entities play in nature. The figure employed is a metaphor, and 10 
discern the Florentine's meaning here, the sense of the metaphor must be elabo-
rated. Now without doubt a grasp of the language is imperative for understanding 
the book, but is the language ail there is, or even what is most essential? [s not the 
thought, or content of the book, even more retlective of its essence than the 
language in which it is composed, and cou Id not Galileo have meant this in using 
the particuJar metaphor which he did? ln this interpretation, mathematics (i.e. 
quantity) is fundamental to nature, but on no account do the whatnesses of phy-
sical things consist in their quantifiable aspects. 19 
The negation of the so ca lied secondary qualities does not oppose our reading 
Galileo in this way. At one point in the Two New Sciences Salviati states: 
1 desire, before passing to any other subject, to cali your attention to the fact 
that these forces, resistances, moments, figures, etc., may be considered either 
in the abstract, disassociated from matter, or in the concrete, associated with 
matter. Hencc the properties that be10ng to figures that are merely geometrical 
and non-material must be moclified when we fill these figures with matter and 
give them weight. 20 
For Galileo, then, what distinguishes the mathematical from the physical, and thus 
what Îs proper to the latter, Îs "matter" and "weight" - two "concrete" charac-
teristics in sorne way sensible. The secondary qualities may not be as real as the 
primary one s, yet they must be trusted at least to the extent that these two properly 
physical qualities can be recognized. In this respect, Galileo's teaching on secon-
dary qualities anticipates Eddington's single, colored-blind eye; granted its re-
portings are imprecise and subjective - nevertheless they cannot be done away 
with. 21 In short, this text both qualifies the Florentine's extreme doctrine in the 
"Assayer", as weil as lends credence to our interpretation outlined above. 
Yet what of Galileo's atomism? Burtt's assertion is that they possess none but 
17. BURTT, op. cil., p. 76. 
18. DRAKI, op. cit., p. 238. 
19. Werner Heisenberg. whcn disclIssing whether or not elemcntary particIes are "al! there is". uses the 
same metaphor as GaIileo with the same interpretation of il as our own. Sec his Philosophical 
Prob/ems of Nue/car PhvSIc.\. N.Y., Fawcett Worid Library 1966. pp. 121-122. 
20. THO "'n,. Science.l. New York. [Jover Publications. Ine. 1954: "Second Day". p. 112. 
21. Cf. A.S. EDDINC;ION, Nelt" Palhways in Science. Ann Arbor. The University of Michigan Press, 
1959. ch. 1, pp. 12-D. 
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mathematical properties. Galileo himself does not say this, although even if it were 
true, one need not then conclude that the Florentine ascribed to the further position 
in question. There is reference to sensible matter being proper to physical things 
not only in the passage just cited, but elsewhere in his works ; furthermore, there is 
the neglected connotation of the metaphor eXplained above that points to some-
thing more critical in nature than mathematical entities alone: finally, there is 
Galileo 's deliberate restriction of his method to inorganic phenomena, a restriction 
that conduces to our interpreting his famous statements as applying to certain parts 
of the physical world, but not to nature in her totality. è2 
Following Burtt's analysis of Galileo come those of Descartes and Hobbes, 
with which we readily concur: the substance or essence of things is clearly exten-
sion for Descartes, and Hobbes unabashedly follows suitY Yet it is consequential 
to add that neither of these thinkers were physicists, and it is with the physicists 
that we are concerned. Our principal intent, again, is to reveal a basic unanimity 
amongst the more important scientists as to the relation between mathematics and 
nature - a unanimity severed by philosophers of Descartes' persuasion. It is 
certainly to Burtt's and Koyré's credit to have disclosed the affinities which join 
Descartes to the scientists discussed thus far; however the identification of their 
respective positions is what we are forced to deny. 
Prior to examining Newton, Burtt briefly discusses the "non-mathematical 
current", as weil as several less renowned thinkers su ch as Barrow and Boyle, both 
of whom, he thinks, follow Descartes' assimilation of the real to the mathema-
tical. 24 Barrow was a mathematician and deeply imbued with the very customs that 
led to Descartes' reduction of matter to extension. Does he, though, acquiesce to 
the Cartesian view? Certainly Barrow considers geometry the paradigm of the 
sciences, and physics to be simply applied mathematics ; he even asserts that "quan-
titative continuity is the object of ail science".25 However, such allegations are not 
equivalent to saying that only the quantitative exists, or that it alone constitutes the 
essence of physical phenomena. Failure to make this distinction will of course lead 
to Burtt's interpretation. 
With Boyle, our author writes that he " ... expresses his complete agreement 
with the mathematical metaphysics of Galileo and Descartes, the whole world 
seems to be fundamentally mathematical in structure; 'nature does play the me-
chanician' ; mathematical and mechanical princip les are the 'alphabet in which God 
wrote the world'''. 26 Once more we have Galileo's metaphor; should it be under-
22. There is also Galileo's "positivism", documented by Burtt on pp. 93-94; if the Florentine was 
unwilling ta grant that the essences of such things as gravit y were rcadily accessible, would he not 
also, a fortiori, maintain a similar reluctance in regard to the nature of physical reality? This would 
further account for his particular choice of metaphor in the "Assayer" text cited above. 
23. For Descartes, cf. ibid., pp. 96-107. and Hobbes, pp. 118-127. 
24. For Barrow, cf. ibid, pp. 145-146; for Boyle, pp. 165-166. 
25. Barrow, in ibid .. p. 145. 
26. Ibid, pp. 165-166. 
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stood in the same way? We wou Id not he so willing to conclude as Burtt does in 
the case of Boyle; the former admits that Descartes and Hobbes were viewed by 
the latter as "extremists"2" and that in Boyle's mind, the secondary qualities wcre 
just as real as the primary ones, His mechanistic tendencies, though, apparently 
suggest the contrary. Given the absence of consistency in Boyle's writings, perhaps 
the more prudent course would be to suspend judgement. 28 
This leaves us with Newton. Burtt concludes of him: 
Just as Boyle, though not a skilled mathematician himself. had accepted with-
out serious question the main structure of the uni verse as portrayed in Galileo, 
Descartes and Hobbes, 50 Newton ... took over without criticism tht: general 
view of the physical world and of man's place in it which had developed at the 
hands of his illustrious predt:cessors. For Newton lOo the world of matter was 
a world possessing mathematical characteristics fundamentally.29 
The reasons for so concluding, as best as we can discern them in Burtt's analysis. 
are derived from Newton's atomism, a view entailing the reduction of ail physical 
changes to interactions of particles equipped with the "primary qualities")Il, as weIl 
as his method - an important aspect of which was the successful use of mathe-
matics. 
Concerning the first, Newton is careful to indicate that the qualities proper to 
the atoms are the very qualities sensed in our common experience. Burtt acknow-
ledges this, but would nonetheless insist that for Newton "the atoms are predo-
minately mathematical". But what is the sense of "mathematical" here? Certainly 
not the sense that Descartes employed, nor the one supposedly used by Galileo. 
Extension is only one attribute of the particles, and nowhere do es Newton say il is 
the predominant one; ail the other attributes may be viewed in quantifiable rela-
tions to one another, but they themse1ves are qualities - c.g., hardncss and impe-
netrability. Or perhaps he is suggesting that in Newton's eyes the quantifiable 
relations are of tht: essence, such that all of the atomic changes - and thus ail of 
the changes in nature - are reducible to mathematical laws. Yet this is not what 
Newton says; the entire Principia may be viewed as an investigation of the mathr-
matical principles of natural philosophy" instead of the non-mathematical ones, 
the two being quite different. lronically enough, Burtt says as much wh en he writes: 
For Newton ... the world is what it is; so far as exact mathematicallaws can be 
discovered in it, weIl and good; so far as not, we must seek to expand our 
mathematics or rt:sign ourselves to some other less certain method. This i~ 
obviously the spirit of the paragraph from the preface of the Principia already 
quoted ... n 
27. Ibid.. p. 170. 
2S. Nevertheles" Ihere are IWO furlher points against Burtt: firstl), hls own admission that 130\ le 
leaned t"wards posilivism (pp. 17X-1 S21. and secondly, Koyré', pilling Boyle against the "pan-
mathcmatism" of Galdeo and Descartes. Cf. N,'\\,lonian SlUdil's, Chicago, the lJniversity of Chicago 
Press. 1965. pp. 11-12. 
29. BLR1T, op. cil., p. 22X. 
30. Ibid.. p. 22X. ff. 
31. Ibid, p. 20X. 
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Unless, then, Burtt wishes ta equivocate on "mathematics", we do not see the 
justification for his uniting Newton 's conceptions with Descartes'; a reduction of 
this sort is to go further than the texts would allow US. 32 
In regard to the second argument, Burtt's very words run counter to his 
general conclusion. This last, again, would seem to be an embracing (on Newton's 
part) of a quantified outlook on nature because of the tremendous success rendered 
by an exclusively mathematical approach. 3J When we turn to the development of the 
argument, though, where Burtt discusses the effects of the method consequent upon 
Newton's concept of mass, we read, 
What about the metaphysical bearings of the Newtonian concept of mass? Did 
Newton conceive of physical bodies as merely masses, that is, possessing none 
but geometrical qualities and vis inertiae '1 Probably not. And yet the effect of 
his work was decidedly to encourage others so to convince them. 14 
This is precisely the point that need be emphasized: Newton himself did not 
subscribe to any identification of mathematics with the substance of nature, but the 
efficacy of his method and the customs consequent upon it may and did turn the 
minds of many in this direction. We will have occasion to elaborate on this below ; 
at this juncture it sufficcs to say that Burtt's train of thought here is indeed weil 
taken, yet antithetical to his general conclusion rcgarding Newtonian metaphysics. 
Further evidence in our favor is Burtt's own assessment of Newton's empi-
ricism. So strong was it that " ... if it were possible to wholly separa te the two 
aspects of his method, it would have to be said that Newton's ultimate criterion 
was more empirical than mathematical". JI Thus " ... it is for Newton, in marked 
contrast with Galileo and Descartes, there is a distinct diffcrcnce between mat he-
matical truths and physical truths. "36 Such being the case, we would argue to the 
intrinsic unlikeliness of Newton ever assenting to an interpretation of his works in 
which the natural is seen to be essentially mathematical. 
To sum up our findings thus far: the achievement that is Burtt's in his Mefa-
physical Foundations of Modern Science, is a notable one in many respects; yet it 
does not successfully prove the position of the more influential scientists to be in 
fact the particular metaphysical foundation which is alleged. We are not suggesting 
that there were no profound disagreements between the conceptions of these physi-
32. The rcason why Burt! alludes ta N ewton's atomism is silllply that this doctrine i, a clear sign for 
him that the author of the Principia had adopted the panmathelllatislll of his predeecssors. If this 
is sa. however, how can Burtt maintain that "For Newton there was absolutely no a priori œr-
tainty, sueh as Kepler, Gali1eo and pre-eminently Descartes be1ieved in. that the world is throllgh 
and through mathematical, still less that its sccrets can be fully unlockcd by the mathematical 
methods already perfected." ') p. 208. 
33. Cf. pp. 226-227. 
34. Ibid., pp. 240-241; for an even clearer enunciation of the same point, cf. pp. 242-243. Necdkss 
to say, this statement wreaks havoc with Burtt's earlier assertton that Newton's atoms arc "predo-
minantly mathematical". 
35. Ibid.. p. 209. 
36. Ibid., p. 20g. 
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cists and those of the ancients, nor do we wish [0 deny the reality of wha! \vas 
indeed a Hrevolution in science". Differences there were. but an identification of 
physical essences with quantity was not one of them. 
* 
* * 
N ow wc must make good our claim to replace Burtt's interpretation with 
something more faithful. If these scientists were not teaching what our author had 
supposed on this question, what were they teaching'! An interpretation that would 
fully recount what the scientists did sav, in addition to accounting for what they 
only suggested, is as follows: mathcmatical propcrtics, or quantities and quanti-
tative relations, constitute the most desireable objects of the intelligence, for only 
these provide the objectivity, precision, darity and certitude that the mind always 
seeks. In brier, the knowledge of such things is the only proper or true knowledgc. 
Obviously quantities and their relations exist in nature, hence it will be to these that 
the physicist must tum, as only here - and not in the realm of the qualitative or 
"occult forms" - will his thirst for such knowledge be assuaged. 1 n consequence, It 
is not surprising that mathematics was incorporated into physics with such vigour, 
and with su ch success; one would indeed expect rapid strides forward givcn the 
extent to which quantity prevails in nature and the zeal with which this aspect of 
the world was studied. Thus we interpret the statements of the post-Renaissance 
physicists in [erms of their quest for a certain kind of knowledge, and not in terms 
of any presupposition regarding the nature of the physical world; in their eyes the 
mathematical side of reality was para mou nt, not because it comprised the most 
important part of things, but rather because it was the most important thing to be 
known. 
This outlook of the early physicists (the existence of which is to be defendecl 
st,,}[tly) is contrasted with a more severe one, that historians often label the" 19 U1 
century world view". What characterized this latter was precisely an identification 
between quantity as the most knowable, and quantity as the on/y knowable thing. 
The road from the first position to the second was a graduai one, and the earliest 
traces of it are found in d'Alembert's Preface to the Encyclopédie: 
L'usage des connaissances mathématiques n'est pas moins grand dans l'exa-
men des corps terrestres qui nous environnent. Toutes les propriétés que nous 
observons dans ces corps ont entr'elles des rapports plus ou moins sensibles 
pour nous: la connaissance ou la découverte de ces rapports est presque 
toujours le seul objet auquel il nous soit permis d'atteindre, et le seul par 
conséquent que nous devions nous proposer.<7 
With time, the now famous doctrine of Lord Kelvin grcw to express the attitude 
proper to many thinkers of his day: 
37. D'Al.EMBERt. Encyclopédie. ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des sCiences des IIrrs Cl des mélien (Nouvelle 
impression en fac-similé de la première édition de 1751-1780 vol. 1. Stuttgart-Bad COIHlstatt. 1966} 
Discours Préilminaire p. vi. 
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1 often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and 
express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannat 
express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind ; 
it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, 
advanced to the stage of science, whatever the matter may be. 18 
This knowable-measurable equivalence was not the only te net of the world picture 
espoused by these scientists, Historians like Dampier \9, and Singer 40, not to men-
tion a host of contemporary physicists, generalize the attitude of the last century 
with the phrase "mechanistic-deterministic", suggesting perhaps that Burtt's inter-
pretation of the early scientists is more apropos of these later ones.-I I 
The development in attitude between Newton's day and Kelvin's is not difficult 
to explain. Physicists and philosophers alike, inured 10 the methods of science and 
intoxicated by its awesome explanatory-predictive power, grew ta construe the 
object of science as the exclusive object of the mind. This was most of al! the case 
with those thinkers whose formation was almost exclusively mathematical and who 
had little real contact with nature. Notice, then, that the resulting 19 th century 
outiook - one still very much alive today - reflected precisely the effects of 
custom, and not the actual position of the more prestigious physicists. The next 
order of business is to return to these same thinkers and brief1y justify our afore-
said interpretation of them. 
Copernicus, we recall, was "highly inf1uenced" by Pythagoreans such as Ni-
cholas of Cusa, Giordano Bruno, and the above-mentioned Novara. We also recal! 
that no textual evidence is found in Copernicus indicating an adoption of authentic 
Pythagoreanism. Nonetheless, there undoubtedly was an inf1uence exerted by these 
men, as Burtt insisted, which justifies our asking in what it consisted. Our author is 
careful to emphasize that for these thinkers "knowledge is al ways measurement", 
and more generaIly, "ail certain knowledge that is possible for man must be mathe-
matical knowledge".42 Sentiments of this kind are definitely implied in Copernicus' 
writings, suggesting that the inf1uence exerted was an induced enthraliment with the 
cogency, simplicity and beauty of mathematical explanations. 43 On this hypothesis, 
his adamant defence of heliocentricity for mathematical reasons is perfectly expli-
cable, and in no way discordant with the traditiünal understanding of astronomy. 
The case of Kepler is even clearer. The texts cited by Burtt to manifest his 
supposed equating of quantity with the "fundamental structure of the universe" 
38. LORD KELVIN, Popular Lectures and Addresses. 11<91-11<94, I.ondon and New York, The Mac-
millan Co. 
39. W.c. DA.MPII.R. A lIistory of' Science. Cambridge. at the Univcrsity Pres" 1930, pp. 213-216,219, 
320, 328-9. 370-72. 
40. C. SINC,IR. A Short lIistory of' Sciemij/c Ideas 10 19()(). Oxford. at the Clarendon Press. 1959, 
pp. 418-422; cf. also A. D'ABRO, The Risi' of the Nell' Phvsics, N.Y .. Dover Publications. 1951. 
vol. 1. p. 61. 
41. Though it is worthwhile remarking that even Kelvin's position is not eqUivalcnt to Burlt', inter-
pretation. 
42. BI RI 1. op. cit .. p. 42. 
43. Cf. "De Revolutionihu,", in op. cit., Prefacc to Pope Paul III, and Bk 1. ch. 1. 
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can be far better understood in Iight of our interpretation. Kepler's remarks 
stressing that quantity is closer ta substance than quality plainly reveal his view 
that the first of these is more stable, more permanent than the second. This in tum 
supports his further inference, ..... that nothing can be known completely except 
quantities or by quantities, and 50 it happens that the conclusions of mathematics 
are more certain and indubitable." Even more cJearly, "Just as the eye was made 
to see colors, and the ear 10 hear sounds, 50 the human mind was made to 
understand, not whatever you please, but quantity. "44 Thus Bunt states with justi-
fication, "Quantitative features (for Kepler) are the sole features of things as far as 
the world of our knowledge is concerned."45 But, as we have repeatedly argued, 
Burtt's proceeding from this to the following conclusion is unwarranted: "There-
fore, quantity is the fundamental feature of things".4" The Erst is dcfinitely present 
in Kepler's words, while the second is not. 
With Galileo, the sundry positions found in his writings (and referred 10 
above) can ail be aecounted for in terms of his having held that mathematical 
knowledge is the most perfect knowJedge, and thus the most important. Obviously, 
one adhering to such a position will strive whenever possible to explain and reduee 
the workings of nature to quantitative analyses, in the form of geometrical demons-
trations and meehanical laws - something which in fact Galileo did. That he 
should tum to a mathematieal atomism, and a rejeetion of the "secondary qua-
lities" is not surprising. Thus mathematics is indeed the key to understanding 
nature's secrets, with "key" meaning: that in virtue of which the mind ean have the 
most perfect knowledge of the physical world - though not in its entirety. The 
Florentine, let us repeat once more, is not asserting that nature is in essence 
mathematical; on the contrary, in his seheme (identieal to Kepler's and Newton's) 
a mathematical approaeh enables us to know certain aspects of nature (i.e., her 
geometrical "letters") in an exact, certain way. In short, the importance of mathe-
maties is the certitude it offers coneerning a part of the physical world, and not a 
grasp of that world in its essence nor in its totality. 
This very distinction is suggested in a passage from his Dialogue on the two 
chief world systems: 
Extensively, that is, with regard to the multitude of intelligibles, which are 
infinite, the human understanding is as nothing even if it understands a thou-
sand propositions ... But taking man's understanding intensively, in so far as 
this term denotes understanding sorne propositions perfectly, 1 say that the 
human intellect does understand some of them perfectly and thus in these it 
has as mueh absolute certainty as nature itself has. Of sueh are the mathe-
matical sciences alone; that is, geometry and arithmetic, in which the divine 
intellect indeed knows infinitely more propositions sinee it knows al!. But with 
44. BURTT, ibid., cf. p. 57 for ail of Kepler's statements citcd in this paragraph. 
45. Ibid., Though the adjective "sole" is unjustitied. 
46. Ibid. 
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regard to those few which the human intellect does understand, 1 believe that 
its knowledge equals the divine in objective certainty, for here it succeeds in 
understanding necessity, beyond which there can be no greater sureness. 47 
The strength of this passage and others 4S indicates our position: Galileo seeks 
mathematical explanations not because they reveal nature in her essence, but rather 
because they en able him to participa te in the certitude of the Divinity Himse\f. 
The same may equally be said of Barrow and, to a lesser extent, of Boyle.49 
Nonetheless the latter admits that mathematical principles, given their certitude 
and c1arity, "must be ultimate truths superior to God himself." Furthermore, they 
are (along with metaphysical principles) the "universal foundations and instruments 
of ail the knowledge we mortals can acquire". Thus Boyle's "mathematical view of 
nature" can very weil be construed as a simple concession that the quantitative 
aspects of things provide us with the most perfect kind of knowledge. 
Lastly, and most importantly, we turn to Newton: did he, in fact, maintain 
this position and not the one attributed to him by Burtt? Again, on the basis of his 
texts alone we would have to say yeso In the Principia he writes: 
Our purpose is only to trace out the quantity and properties of this force 
(attraction) from the phenomena and to apply what we discover in some 
simple cases, as principles, by which, in a mathematical way, we may estimate 
the effects thereof in more involved cases ... We said 'in a mathematical way', 
to avoid a1l questions about the nature or quality of this force, which we 
would not be understood to determine by any hypothesis. 50 
Here he explicitly acknowledges the restricted character of his enterprise, in as much 
as the "natures", "qualities" or ultimate causes lie simply beyond its bounds. s, 
What the use of mathematics does give is a clear, rigorous and certain explanation, 
as witness its ability to predict and control phenomena. As in the case of his 
predecessors, mathematics for Newton is desireable for the knowledge it gives us -
not because it is intimate\y entwined with the essence of nature. In fact, this last 
assertion would be tantamount to the particular kind of hypothesis he was al ways 
careful to avoid. 52 
Burtt's emphasis on Newton's restricting himself to the "how" of things fur-
ther supports this. In one pertinent passage. he makes the very point which we 
intend: 
For Newton, then, science was composed of laws stating the mathematical 
behavior of nature solely - laws clearly dcducible l'rom phenomena and exact-
ly verifiable in phenomena - everything l"urthcr is to be swept out of ~cienee, 
47. Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief ~V()rld .\·vslems, translated by Still man Drake. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, The University of Californ;a Press. 1967. p. 103. 
48. Cf. for example, Koyré's rekrcnce in his ElUdes, ele.. p. 172. 
49. Cf. again in Burt!'s analvs;s, pp. 14,,-7. and for Boylc. p. 166. 
50. Bk 1lI, "The System of the World'·. as quoted in ihid. pp. 11 X-19. 
5!. Cf. also "General Scholium" in "Principia" Bk Ill. GreaI Books. vol. 34, p .. Hi. 
52. For a discussion of Newton's eschewing of hypotheses, cf. KOlRI, A'ell'/Ofllan Sludies. p. Ih and 
ch. II. 
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which thus becomes a body of absolutely certain truth about the doings of the 
physical world. 51 
The further inferences, we repeat, to the effect that this "mathematical behavior" is 
the only behavior, or the only knowable one, are not to be found in Newton, nor 
must they be assumed in order to explain what he does say. On the contrary. the 
summation given by Burtt here is ail one need say; it stresses the key role of 
mathcmatics in our knowledge, and not its role in things. 
To summarize thus far. the "heart of the new scientific metaphysics" is not 
what Burtt and others would have us believe. A new out look there certainly was. 
but it did not consist in the reduction of nature to mathematics. As we have 
laboured to show with the above analysis, it seems best to understand the attitude 
of post-Renaissance science to consist in a renunciation of the study of natural 
qualities - the approach of the ancient physicists, by and large, - and an em-
bracing of ail investigations into natural quantities. The reason being that the 
knowledge of quantity is the most perfect knowledge accessible to inquiring man, 
and hence the most desireable. In consequence, it was only a matter of lime befme 
physics became mathematical, that is, the exact science of physical quantities; in 
Kelvin's terminology, physics was heretofore the science of the measureable. 
* 
* * 
The question now ta be faced is in regard ta the views of relativity and quantum 
physicists. Would they subscribe to the doctrine of their "dassical" precursors as 
we have interpreted it? Are the mathematical features of nature the most impor-
tant, indeed, the sole objects of knowledge (to follow the 19 th century outlook) for 
thinkers such as Einstein, Bohr, Planck, Heisenberg and the like? Our daim is that 
there is partial agreement, but equally substantial disagreement. Let us begin with 
the similarities. 
For sure, the quantitative, or the measureable, is the proper subject of physics 
equally for current scientists as for dassical. It is ais a true for modern science that 
the measureable is not ail that exists, nor is it most essential to the physical world. 
Eddington makes the first point when writing "1 should Iike to make it c1ear that 
the limitation of the scope of physics ta pointer readings and the like is not a 
philosophical craze of my own but is essentially the current scientific doctrine. ";4 
And Heisenberg attests: 
This general tendency of the new science also foreshadows a characteristic 
feature that has often been discussed, namely the emphasis on the quantitative. 
The demand for precise experimental conditions, accu rate measurements, an 
53, BlJwn, op. cil .. p, 22.', 
54, The NaTUre of [he Phrsica/ fl'or/d. London. Everyman Library. 1927. p. 247, Cr. also pp, 245.249, 
266. 324. 
67 
NORMAN DE SILVA 
exact unambiguous terminology and a mathematical presentation of the idea-
lized phenomena has determined the aspect of this science of nature, and 
brought il the name of "exact science".55 
Whereas classical physicists lent themselves to mis-interpretation concerning the 
measureable or quantitative not being equivalent to the essence of the real, scien-
tists of this century are outspokenly unambiguous. To cite Eddington once more: 
Scientific investigation does not lead to knowledge of the intrinsic nature of 
things. Whenever we state the properties of a body in terms of physical quan-
tities we are imparting knowledge as to the response of various metrical indi-
cators to its presence, and nothing more. 56 
Heisenberg also insists on this in a passage where he comments on the work of 
Heinrich Hertz: 
..... here it emerges clearly how physics began to remember once more that a 
natural science is one who se propositions on limited domains of nature can 
have only a correspondingly limited validity; and that science is not a philo-
sophy developing a world view of nature as a whole or about the essence of 
things. 57 
In the sa me work the author concedes that "this modesty was largely lost during 
the nineteenth century", 58 when, as we indicated earlier, many grew to consider 
physics as having a greater power and scope than it actually did have. Heisenberg 
insists, though, that a proc1ivity of this kind is antithetical to science: "The philo-
sophic content of a science is only preserved if science is conscious of its limits". 59 
The third point of agreement between the two is the acknowledgment that the 
mathematical approach is the most objective, precise and clear - at least for those 
initiated ta its language. Indeed, this is precisely what sustains physics in its role of 
paradigm, or model, for the other sciences Y' 
At this point the unanimity ceases, and significant differences arise. We noticed 
with the classical physicists a tendency ta view the non-quantifiable as insignificant, 
and even unknowable for thinkers of Kelvin's persuasion. Accordingly, sciences 
such as biology were hardly worth the effort, or their subjects viewed as unknow-
able, unless, of course, they could employ mathematics and reduce the living to the 
measureable. Now such efforts of reduction were attempted in the last century, and 
55. Across the Frontlers. N.Y., Harper and Row Publishers, 1975, p. 216-17. Cf. also Physics and Phi-
losophy, N.Y .• Harper & Row, 1958, pp. 101-2. 
56. E[)l>I~GTO~. op. cit .. p. 292; cf. also p. 251, 260-63, 280-1; N. BOHR, A/omie Physies and Human 
Knoll/edge. N.Y .. John Wiley and Sons, vol. l, p. 7, vol. 2, p. 10; H. POINCARE, Science and 
Hypothesis, N.Y., Dover Publications, 1952, ch. XlI, p. 211. 
57. Phys/cis!'s Conception of' Nature, Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1970, pp. 152-3. 
5S. lb/d., pp. 180-81. 
59. Ibid. 
60. Cf. M. PIA~(,K, The Phi/osophy of Phys/cs, N.Y., W.W. Norton & Company, Ine., 1936, p. 10; 
L. DE BROGI.IF, Matter and Lighr, N.Y., Dover Publications, Inc., pp. 38-39; HFISENBERG, Across 
the Fronliers, p. 216. 
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had failed. Significantly enough, Bohr, Heisenberg, de Broglie and Einstein orten 
acknowledged the failure, but for that reason did no! shirk off the biological 
sciences as impossible or unfruitful, nor did they ban these disciplines l'rom natural 
science. 61 Granted the objectivity and precision - the "clarity" as Einstein would 
say - are not present with organic phenomena to the same degree .1' the inorganic, 
this does not and should not prevent scientists l'rom pursuing the study of life. 
Knowledge of non-mathematical kind abounds in this realm. and it is both lcgi-
timate and fruitful; for according to Bohr and Heisenberg, it i5 complementary 
with the knowledge acquired in mathematical physics. Bohr. for exarnple. writes: 
Owing to this essential feature of complementarity, the concept of purpose. 
which is foreign to mechanical analysis, finds a certain field of application in 
biology. Indeed, in this sense, teleological argumentation may be regarded as a 
legitimate feature of physiological description which takes due regard to the 
characteristics of life in a way analogous to the recognition of the quantum of 
action in the correspondance argument of atomic physics. 6 : 
Thus for these physicists 6J the knowable is not restricted to the measureable; iD 
fact, investigations of the non-measureable are both legitimate and fruitful. 
They are also objective and certain - a further daim which dassical physicists 
would undoubtedly deny. Here again, it is in the realm of the living that this i5 
most c1early disclosed. Bohr considers the existence of life an elementary fact, 
which is as important to biology as the quantum of action is to atomic physics. 6• 
Secondly, Planck and Eddington bear witness to one's internaI experience of 
freedom and responsibility. This experience, they maintain, is certain, Immediate 
and objective, but obviously not measureable, nor subject to mathematical laws65 
ln discussing the points of disagreement between classical and modern phy-
sicists, we have heretofore exhibited the latter's inclination to uphold the worth-
whileness of studying the non-measureable. We must now ask whether the same 
physicists wou Id grant the legitimacy of an approach that investigated the measu-
reable without recourse to measurement. 1 n others words, do twentieth cent ury 
scientists sever themselves from their predecessors even more strongly by allowing 
for a successful non-mathematical approach to inorganic phcnomena - one that 
would concentrate on physical qualities rather than quantities alone? 
To make such an allowance would fly in the face of Newton and Galileo; 
nevertheless, several scientists of this era have done so. To see how, it behooves us 
61. Cf. HnSENBERG. Physics and Philosophy, pp. 102-5.154-5; DE BROGUE. Physics and Microphy.\in. 
N.Y .• Harper and Brothers, 1960. pp. 139-40; R.W. ClARK, Fins/cin. the Ufe and Times, 1'>.Y., 
World Publishing Co .• 1971, p. 35. 
62. A/omie Physics and Human Knowledge, vol. 1, p. ](); cf. the entirc chapters OOLight and LICe." 
"Biology and Atomic Physics"; see also HElSI.NBI:R(;. Physic.\' and Philosophy, pp. 154-5; Philos(}-
phical Proh/ems of Nuclear Science. p. 102. 
63. And others in addition; cf. Max BORN, Physics in My Generation, N.Y., Springer-Verlag Inc., 1969. 
p. v and foIiowing. 
64. BOHR, op. cil., pp. 9. 21. 
65. For Planck, cf. op. cil .• pp. 79-XO, 102-05; EDDINGTON, AcH' Path"'ays in SClellce, pp. 90-91. 
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to set forth Heisenberg's remarks on the researches of Goethe in the sphere of 
color. The poet's scientific method is described in these words: 
For Goethe, ail observation and understanding of nature began with the im-
mediate sensory impression; not, therefore, with an isolated phenomenon, 
filtered out with instruments and so to speak wrung from nature, but with the 
free natural happening, directly accessible to our senses. h6 
Heisenberg goes on to add that in other respects, Goethe's method (and con-
clusions) closely resembled that of Newton's: th us the former assuredly leaned on a 
kind of experimentation, and developed theories to the same extent as the latter. 67 
But the distinguishing feature, to repeat, was the absence of measurement and 
mathematics. Does Heisenberg concede any value to Goethe-type efforts? In res-
ponse, here are his very words: 
Dividing reality in this way into different aspects immediately resolves the 
contradiction between Goethe's and Newton's theories of color. In the great 
structure of science, the two theories take up different positions. It is certain 
that an acceptance of modern physics cannot prevent the scientist from fol-
lowing Goethe's way of contemplating nature toO.6~ 
If we follow correctly, only a combination of the mathematical and non-mat he-
matical avenues will produce an understanding of the physical world in its entirety, 
which is to say that the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of things must bath 
be regarded in the total study of nature. 
This same point is implicitly made in Heisenberg's (and others) insistence on 
the physicists constant recourse to "ordinary language".69 This language, argues 
Heisenberg, signifies concepts which are derived from an immediate connection 
with reality. They consequently represent the real more faithfully than the mathe-
matical idealizations of physics, and thus "seem to be more stable in the expansion 
of knowledge than the precise ter ms of scientific language".)O If science hopes to 
secure stability, as weil as remain in contact with the concrete physical world it 
attempts to explain, then the kind of concepts signified by plain language must 
never be abandoned. This reveals again the basic insufficiency of a physics exclu si-
vely tied to mathematics, and emphasizes the necessity of complementing the ma-
thematical approach with that of the qualitative, or non-mathematical. 
At this point it is opportune to make known the similarities which tie together 
the positions of Heisenberg and Bohr in this regard with those of a multitude of 
scientists stemming as far back as antiquity. The poet-physicist Goethe is one 
66. Across the Frontiers, p. 123; cf. 124-135. 
67. Ibid., p. 124, 141. 
68. Philosophical Problems of Nuc/ear Science, pp. 84-85. 
69. Cf. especially Physics and Philosophy, pp. 55-56, 75, 200-202: Aeros.l· the Frontiers, p. 120; BOHR, 
op. cit., vol. 1, p. 67; vol. 2, p. 59: A.N. WHITEHEAD, The Aims of Education, N.Y .• New American 
Library, 1952, p. llO. 
70. Physics and Philosophy, p. 200. 
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thinker among many in a long tradition of physicists who dirt:cted their pursuits 
more towards the qualitative aspects of things than the quantitative. 1 n this century 
and the last, the biological sciences have been the principal realm wherein this 
tradition thrived. The t:volutionists such as Lemark, Darwin, Spencer and Huxley, 
together with the naturalists Fabre, Von Frisch and the ethologists Lorenz, Tin-
bergen are all cases in point. ln the years before Goethe, several non-mathematical 
researches were conducted in phyS1CS, most notably by Gilbert and Boyle. 71 Ail of 
these scientists were similar in approach to a large number of medieval scholastics, 
including Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, and his studt:nt Thomas Aquinas. 
The bulk of the scholastic physicists were Aristote1ians, however, and it is 
properly with Aristotle that the tradition begins. [n his Physics the Stagirite clearly 
distinguishes natural philosophy from mathematics 72, yet all the while admits tht: 
preponderance of quantity in things and hence the possibility of successful!y ap-
plying mathematics to nature. Of equal importance is his emphasis on the role of 
common t:xperience. Here he anticipates Heisenberg's doctrine of "ordinary lan-
guage" in pointing out that rellection on common experience, as represented by 
common concepts and signified by common terms, is the necessary starting point of 
natural science. 
Thus the modifications of the 17 th cent ury "scientific metaphysics" made by 
physicists of this cent ury definitely disclose a unanimity of thought amongst scien-
tists of ail ages regarding the possibility of a mathematical physics. That which the 
non-mathematical current has in common with the mathematical explains in a 
general way why the natural world can be studied mathematically with such great 
success, and why, correspondingly, an exclusively mathematical physics is deficient. 
This common ground was ignored with the advent of the "scientific revolution", 
and certainly denied in the outlook of the last cent ury ; nonetheless, contrary to 
Burtt's interpretation, the prestigious scientists never replaced it with a mathema-
tization of nature. 
* 
* * 
By way of summary, two general conclusions arise from our analysis. First, 
according to the physicists themsclves, it is not neeessary to explain the possibility 
and successes of a mathematical physics through any kind of reduction of nature to 
mathematics. Ali that needs be said is that nature has quantity, but is not quantity 
in essence. Now to so argue is advantageous, for we not only justify the efficacious 
application of mathematics to nature, but in addition, avoid the adverse conse-
quences of an essentially quantifïed world enumerated at the outset. 
The above conclusion, while being the chief point intended in this article, is 
nonetheless followed by another of even greater import. If it is true to say that 
71. Cf. Bl;RTT, op. ClI., pp. 156-160, and above pp. 56-57. 
72. Physics Il, ch. 2. 
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quantity is not "ail there is" to the physical world. nor even what constitutes its 
essence, then a qualitative study of nature becomes just as important as a mathe-
matical or quantitative one. Such an approach was conducted by Aristotle in his 
PhysÎcs, Gilbert in his De Magnate and Goethe in his Zur Farbenlehre, and as 
Heisenberg puts it, mathematical physics is obligated to make room for these kinds 
of endeavours. for only in virtue of them will physical science ever achieve a 
knowledge of nature in her totality. 
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